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1. INTRODUCTION
Immigration once again is the focus of heated political
debate in the United States. Illegal immigration to the United
States is increasing rapidly, straining the budgets of states
such as Texas and California, which are forced to increase
expenditures on social services to support illegal immigrants.'
Unemployment remains high in many of these states,
especially among unskilled workers, and some people blame
illegal immigrants for these high unemployment rates.2
Governor Pete Wilson of California, long unpopular because of
the dismal condition of his state's economy, nevertheless was
reelected recently to another term as governor, in part because
of his attacks on illegal immigration.3 President Clinton also
" J.D. Candidate, 1995, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
1992, Princeton University. I would like to thank Fernando Chang-Muy for
his helpful suggestions in writing this Comment. I dedicate this Comment
to my mother and father, Diana and Harry Fertik, to whom I owe more than
I can ever repay.
1 See Jennifer Bojorquez, Strangers in a Strange Land: As Immigrants,
They're at the Center of a Bitter and Hot Debate, as Children, They Don't
Understand, Sacramento Bee, Dec. 3, 1993, at SC1. The office of the
governor of California estimates that illegal immigrants cost the state
nearly $3 billion per year. Id.
2 See Jaclyn Fierman, Is Immigration Hurting the U.S.?, Fortune, Aug.
9, 1993, at 76.
' See Bojorquez, supra note 1, at SCI. Governor Wilson has sued the
federal government in an effort to force it to pay for the cost of providing
services to California's illegal immigrants and has called for a constitutional
amendment denying citizenship to children of illegal immigrants who are
born in the United States. Id. Governor Wilson's strong stance on illegal
immigration is considered to be one of the reasons he was reelected. See
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has called for a crackdown on illegal immigration.4 This
renewed focus on illegal immigration has led to calls for a
reevaluation of current U.S. immigration policy generally.'
Although illegal immigration arguably drains U.S.
resources, legal immigration can stimulate economic growth.'
In order to achieve this goal, Congress recently revised the
immigration laws by passing the Immigration Act of 1990 ("the
Act").7 One of the programs created by the Act that was
expected to bring immediate benefit to the U.S. economy is the
Immigrant Investor Program ("the Program"). The Program
makes 10,000 visas available to immigrants who invest at
least $1 million in a new business that creates at least ten full
time jobs.8 Commentators expected the Program to attract
nearly $8 billion annually and to create nearly 100,000 jobs
each year. So far, however the results of the Program have
been disappointing: only 725 people have applied for
permanent residency under this program during its first two
years and only 296 applications have been approved.'
Compared to the success that other countries, particularly
Canada, have had with similar programs, the results of the
U.S. program have been a major disappointment.
This Comment examines why the Program failed and
suggests several reforms that could help it reach its potential.
Section 2 of this Comment examines the origins of the
Program and discusses both the Act and the regulations that
govern the Program. Section 3 critiques the Program and
analyzes Congressional efforts to increase support for the
Program. Section 4 suggests reforms that may increase
Wilson In; Senate ight, Governor Scores Big Victory, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 9, 1994, at Al.
" See John Broder, Immigration Delicate Issue for Clinton, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1993, at Al.
See Fierman, supra note 2, at 76.
I& (noting that legal immigrants benefit the economy by creating jobs
and income).
" Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified
at various sections of 8 U.S.C.). One of the goals of the Act is to stimulate
the U.S. economy.
8 See Fierman, supra note 2, at 76.
9 See id. One hundred forty applications have been rejected and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") has not acted on the rest.
Id.
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participation in the Program.
This Comment concludes that the primary reasons for the
Program's failure are that Congress overestimated the amount
that aliens would pay for U.S. visas and that it failed to
specify exactly what the goals of the Program should be. This
Comment suggests that the two main goals of the Program
should be attracting entrepreneurs and increasing foreign
investment in the United States. Towards that end, this
Comment recommends that two different options be made
available to immigrant investors under the Program: either
creating a new business or investing in a closely-regulated
capital fund that will create new job opportunities. This
Comment also argues that the Program should be revised to
reduce by half the amount of capital required to participate in
the Program. These suggested revisions, and others, would
have the effect of lowering the economic threshold for
participation in the Program, as well as expanding the range
of investment options available under the Program, which, in
turn, should increase interest and participation in the
Program.
2. THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAM
2.1. Origins of the Program
Since the 1965 reform of the U.S. immigration laws,10 the
primary emphasis of U.S. immigration policy has been on the
reunification of families. The 1965 reforms rejected the
national quota system established in 1924 and the
discriminatory principles upon which it was based. 2 Since
1965, the basic policies underlying U.S. immigration law have
not changed. Immigration policy during the early 1980s
focused on refugees and illegal immigrants, not on legal
10 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
"Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed).
12 See Marianne Grin & Miguel Lawson, The Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 255, 255-6 (1992).
The 1924 Immigration Act created a system of national quotas based on the
percentage of that nationality in the population of the United States in the
1920 census. Immigrants from some areas, such as Asia, were barred
entirely. The 1965 Immigration Act set an annual ceiling of 170,000
immigrants, with no more than 20,000 to come from any one country. This
dramatically increased Asian and Hispanic immigration. Id
1994]
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immigrants, and culminated in reforms to the immigration
laws in 1986 that were intended to exclude illegal
immigrants."3 Throughout this period, there was little call
for change in the laws governing legal immigration.
In the late 1980s, however, the United States grew anxious
about its position in the global economy. Pressure to improve
the international competitiveness of U.S. businesses and
workers led Congress to propose legislation intended to aid
U.S. businesses competing in the global economy. Congress
proposed changes to the U.S. immigration laws relating to
legal immigrants as part of its broader effort to improve the
U.S. position in the global marketplace.
Proponents of changing the U.S. immigration laws in order
to benefit the economy identified both Canada and Australia
as models. In 1986, Canada initiated a program that granted
visas to foreign investors who had a net worth of at least
$500,000" and who had invested at least $250,000 in the
Canadian economy.'5 This program was designed primarily
to attract wealthy Hong Kong residents, who were, anxious
about the future of the colony following the 1989 Tienamen
Square massacre and in light of the Chinese government's
pending takeover of the colony in 1997.16 The Canadian
program has been a great success: an estimated $2 to $4
billion per year has been invested in Canada by immigrants
from Hong Kong'" and more than 10,000 jobs have been
1 Immigration Reform and ContrQl Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (amending scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Congress intended to
curb illegal immigration primarily by imposing sanctions on employers who
did not verify that the employees they hired were legal residents of the
United States. In addition, the law extended amnesty to those illegal
immigrants who could prove they were in the United States before 1982 and
had remained in the country since that time.
"4 All dollar amounts in this Comment are in U.S. currency unless
otherwise indicated.
15 See Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Hong Kong West, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1989, at A27.
16 See William Claiborne, The New "Hongs" of Vancouver: Canadian City
Becomes a Haven for Hong Kong's Wealthiest Families, WASH. POST, May 12,
1991, at H1.
1 See James Leung, California Tries to Lure Rich Asian Immigrants,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1991, at Al (noting that immigrants invested $2
billion a year in Canada); Claiborne, supra note 16, at Hi (noting that
immigrants invested $4 billion a year in Canada).
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created.'" Australia also has had success in luring wealthyimmigrants with a similar program; over thirty percent of the
visas Australia issued in 1990 were to immigrants from Hong
Kong."9
The success of the Canadian and Australian programs led
Congress to include the Program as part of the reforms
contained in the Act. The Act tripled the number of visas
allocated for employment-related immigrants0 and created
the visa category of immigrant investor.2 ' The goal of the
" Anne Swardson, Visas for Sale! (Count Your Fingers): Canadian
Migrant Program Under Fire From Some Who Got Burned, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 1993, at A12. Over 110,000 residents, of Hong Kong have
immigrated to Canada over the past seven years, and Canadian officials
expect the number will increase as the 1997 Chinese takeover of Hong Kong
approaches. The western city of Vancouver has had particular success in
attracting wealthy Hong Kong immigrants. Twenty-seven percent of the
inhabitants of Vancouver are ethnic Chinese and they are credited with
revitalizing the city and contributing to the growing importance of Canada's
Pacific coast. See Claiborne, supra note 16, at H1.
" For a general discussion of Australia's immigration program, see Gary
Endelman & Jeffrey Hardy, Uncle Sam Wants You: Foreign Investment and
the Immigration Act of 1990, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 682 (1991).
2108 U.S.C. § 1151(a). The 1990 Act creates five categories of
employment-based relationships: 1) priority workers; 2) professional
workers; 3) skilled, professional workers; 4) certain special immigrants; and
5) investors. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)-(5). This Comment is concerned
primarily with the last category.
" Previously, the law allowed immigrants to enter the United States
under the E-1 and E-2 treaty immigrant provisions. These two categories
allowed an alien of a country with whom the United States had a treaty to
enter the United States either to carry on trade between the United States
and the alien's country of origin, or to manage a business in the United
States in which the alien had invested a substantial amount of money.
These two categories, however, only allowed the alien to remain within the
United States so long as the alien was carrying on business activity, and it
was very hard to change the alien's status to permanent residency. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E). For a general discussion of immigration provisions
available for aliens entering the United States for business purposes, see
Gittel Gordon, Immigration Visas Strategies for Foreign Business People
Entering the U.S., 25 BEVERLY HILLS B. A. J. 90 (1991); Steven J.
Klearman, Nonimmigrant Business Visas After the Immigrant Act of 1990,
28 GONZ. L. REV. 53 (1992-93). For an example of an immigrant in the E-2
category being denied permanent residency, see Han v. Hendricks, No. 90-
16164, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 29991 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1991).
In addition, under the old immigration laws, an investor could
immigrate under a nonpreference category, if the investment was at least
$40,000 and if the investor hired one U.S. citizen or permanent resident.
This nonpreference category, however, was part of a larger pool open to
other immigrants in addition to investors and it generally has been filled by
1994]
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Program was simple: to boost the U.S. economy.22 Through
the Program, Congress hoped to lure both capital investment
and skilled workers to the United States from abroad while at
the same time creating jobs for U.S. workers.
Some members of Congress took exception to the Program
because it would admit individuals to the United States whose
motives for emigrating were solely economic, rather than
patriotic.2 3 Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, the Program's most
ardent critic in the Senate, stated:
I abhor the thought of somebody having a million
dollars and sailing right by the Statute of Liberty,
whether he cares anything about the country or not.
He may be on the lam from the law. He may be
anything. But he is not necessarily coming here
because he loves Uncle Sugar [sic] and our wonderful
flag.
2 4
Senator Bumpers also was concerned that drug dealers or
other criminals might use the Program as a means of entering
the United States. Finally, Senator Bumpers expressed his
belief that increased foreign investment in the United States
was dangerous.25
Advocates of the Program, however, noted its economic
benefits. They argued that the Program could attract up to $8
billion in capital and create up to 100,000 new jobs each
year.2" Members of Congress who supported the Program 7
these other immigrants to the exclusion of investors. See Lee Wen Su, Hot
Dog Stands or High Tech? The Fate of Taiwanese Investors and the
Immigration Act of 1990, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 63, 65 n.11 (1993).
22 See S. REP. No. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Session 22 (1989) ("[The Program]
is intended to create new employment for U.S. workers and to infuse new
capital into the country, not to provide immigrant visas for wealthy
individuals.").
2'3 These critics failed to recall, however, that immigrants arriving in the
early 20th century came to the United States because they perceived an
abundance of opportunity. Thus, their motives were primarily economic as
well.
24 135 CONG. REC. S7769 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers).
5 Id. See also infra section 2.2.
26 See Ashley Dunn, Lure of Visas Fails to Attract Rich Investors, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at A3.
27 See 135 CONG. REC. S7772 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
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emphasized that immigrant investment was intended to
"benefit the U.S. economy.""8 Senator Bumper's attempt to
delete the Program from the immigration reform bill
ultimately failed."
2.2. Details of the Program
The Act makes up to 10,000 visas available per year for
immigrant investors.3 0  An applicant for an immigrant
investor visa must meet two main criteria. First, the applicant
must establish a commercial enterprise that will create no less
than ten new, full-time jobs for U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, exclusive of the applicant and the applicant's spouse
and children.3 Second, the applicant must invest at least $1
million in the enterprise, although the attorney general may
lower this requirement to $500,000 if the enterprise is located
in a "targetted [sic] employment area," for which 3,000 of the
visas available under the Act are reserved.32 A "targeted
employment area" is defined as any area that has a high
unemployment rate (at least 1.5 times the national average) or
is a rural area.3  The attorney general is directed to
designate targeted employment areas in consultation with
state and local officials.
Simon) (noting that many of the criteria for immigration to the United
States under the old law are economic and suggesting there was nothing
wrong with imposing economic criteria in the Program); 135 CONG. REC.
S7771 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("We are talking
about new jobs."); 135 CONG. REC. S7770 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Gramm) ("If people have been successful in business . . . they then
have a right to come here and to practice that business.").
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1993); S. REP. No. 55, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).
29 See 135 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (noting that the
Bumpers Amendment was defeated by a vote of 43-56, with one abstention).
30 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
31 I&
32 1d.
3 I& A "rural area" is defined as "any area other than an area within
a metropolitan statistical area or within the outer boundary of any city or
town having a population of 20,000 or more (based on the most recent
decennial census of the United States)." 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp.
V 1993). The attorney general may raise the amount of investment required
in non-rural areas of high employment to up to $3 million, though this has
not yet been done. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. V 1993).
1994]
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During the debate over the Program, Senator Bumpers
expressed concern about the possibility of fraud by drug
dealers or other criminals. In part to alleviate this concern,
the Act states that when permanent resident status is granted
to an immigrant investor, his or her spouse, and/or his or her
children under the Program, that status is conditional for the
first two years. 4 Within ninety days of the termination of
the initial two-year period, the investor must submit a petition
to the Department of Justice to convert his or her status to
permanent status.3 5 The petition must demonstrate that: 1)
the immigrant invested the required capital in the established
commercial enterprise; and 2) the investor continued to be
associated with the enterprise for at least two years. 6 The
duty to file the petition rests with the investor; the attorney
general is directed to provide notice of the ninety-day period,
but failure to do so does not affect the enforcement of this
provision.' The law imposes criminal penalties on
immigrants who fraudulently establish an enterprise in order
to enter the United States under the Program."
Although the Act passed and was signed by then-President
George Bush on November 29, 1990,3' the INS did not issue
final regulations governing the Program until November 29,
1991, exactly one year after the Act was signed. This delay
resulted in uncertainty over the details of the Program and
may have contributed to the poor response the Program has
received.'
The INS regulations generally parallel the requirements
set forth by Congress in the Act.4 ' The regulations require
that the immigrant invest at least $1 million in capital in a
34 8 U.S.C. § 1186b (Supp. V 1993). This provision of the Act was
modeled on the conditional residency granted to aliens who marry U.S.
citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (Supp. V 1993).3 5 Id.
36 Id.
38 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (Supp. V 1993). The law provides for a maximum
punishment of five years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.
"' See Robert L. DeMoss, Citizenship For Sale or Incentive for Economic
Development? The New Foreign Investment and Immigration Category, 38
FED. B. NEWS & J. 442, 442 (1991).
40 See infra section 3.1.
41 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (1993).
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commercial enterprise. "Capital" is defined as:
cash, equipment, inventory, other tangible property,
cash equivalents, and indebtedness secured by assets
owned by the alien entrepreneur, provided that the
alien entrepreneur is personally and primarily liable
and that the assets of the new commercial enterprise
upon which the petition is based are not used to secure
any of the indebtedness."
The regulations initially excluded intangible property,
leases, or other forms of indebtedness from the definition of
capital. Criticism from commentators led the INS to add these
categories to the final regulations, so that a wider variety of
capital could be used as an initial investment.43 Under the
regulations, the investor also must disclose the sources of his
or her capital to prove that the capital was not obtained
illegally.44
The commercial enterprise created must be a for-profit
activity.45 "For-profit" status can be achieved in one of three
ways: 1) creating a new business; 2) purchasing an existing
business and reorganizing it "such that a new commercial
enterprise results;" or 3) investing in an existing business with
a forty percent net increase in either revenues orjobs resulting
from the investment.4" The immigrant must show that the
42 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1993).
4' For an example of such criticism, see Endelman & Hardy, supra note
19, at 673.
44 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j) (1993).
4r 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1993). Commercial enterprises specifically include:
"sole proprietorship, partnership (whether limited or general), holding
company, joint venture, corporation, business trust, or other entity which
may be publically [sic] or privately owned .... This definition shall not
include noncommercial activity such as owning and operating a personal
residence." Id. This definition, which includes almost all commercial
activity, appears consistent with the statute. The definition is, however,
subject to criticism on other grounds. See, e.g., DeMoss, supra note 39, at
445 (suggesting that it was not Congress' intent to regulate excessively what
type of investments should qualify); Endelman & Hardy, supra note 19, at
674 (suggesting that the regulations actually inhibit job creation).
46 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(h) (1993). If the immigrant invests in an existing
business, he or she may avoid the 40% requirement by purchasing the
business outright but still must comply with the capital and job-creation
requirements of the statute. See Leon Wildes, Obtaining Permanent
Residence in the United States Through Inerstment, at *4 (PLI Litig. &
1994]
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capital actually has been invested.4' The investor also may
combine his or her resources with other investors, so that the
minimum requirements are met for each individual."
Finally, the investor must show that the commercial
enterprise will create at least ten jobs for U.S. citizens or
authorized permanent residents. This requirement is relaxed
when the immigrant invests in a "troubled business." For
instance, if a business had a net loss for accounting purposes
for at least two years and the immigrant invests enough
money so that ten jobs that otherwise would have been lost are
maintained at pre-investment levels for at least two years,
then this will satisfy the job-creation requirement.49
Investors seem generally to be satisfied with these
regulations.5" The INS, however, still has not issued
regulations detailing exactly what must be done to remove the
two-year conditional status. In 1992, the Department of
Justice announced that it was working on regulations detailing
how immigrant investors could become permanent
residents.51  Since the INS still has not issued these
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 331, 1992), available in
WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
47 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2) (1993). The regulations state that:
the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the petitioner
has placed the required amount of capital at risk for the purpose of
generating a return on the capital placed at risk. Evidence of mere
intent to invest ... will not suffice to show that the petitioner is
actively in the process of investing.
Id. Commentators have noted, however, that the immigrant need not show
that the investment actually has been completed-a binding commitment is
enough, even when the contract is contingent on the issuance of the visa.
See Wildes, supra note 46, at *3.
48 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(g) (1993). This statutory interpretation seems to
mean that there is no "one investor, one investment" rule. See DeMoss,
supra note 39, at 446.
49 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(4)(ii) (1993). It is unlikely that a foreign investor
will take advantage of this category, however, because it would probably
take a much larger amount of money to "rescue" a failing business. An
investor probably will not buy a company and pay 10 employees for two
years simply to obtain a visa, especially when he or she can spend less
money and invest in a new business.
5 See Dunn, supra note 26, at A12. One immigration attorney in Hong
Kong praised the regulations as "a great liberalization of [previous]
regulations." Id. Interest in the Program seems to have increased since the
final regulations were approved. Id.
"' See Jane Applegate, Slow INS Response Thwarts Poreign Investment
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regulations, investors understandably are nervous about
participating in the Program because there is no guarantee
that they will be permitted to remain in the United States
after the statutory two-year probationary period expires.52
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM
3.1. Expectations and Results
When Congress created the Program, many immigration
lawyers greeted it with great excitement. Many expected the
demand for visas under the Program to exceed the 10,000
available per year.5" One policy analyst claimed that: "a lot
of people have thought of this as a mini-gold mine."54
Anticipating that many people would apply for immigrant
investor visas, commentators expected that significant
amounts of capital would be raised in the United States. The
success of the Canadian immigrant investor program, and
particularly the experience of British Columbia,5" further
fueled the optimism in the United States. Many immigration
lawyers were eager to establish investment opportunities for
the thousands of immigrants whom they assumed would be
clamoring to enter the United States.5" Many individual
Program, WASH. PoST, Aug. 3, 1992, at F9.
S2 In fact, the statutory requirements for removing the condition placed
on the initial grant of permanent residency under the Program are fairly
well detailed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186b (Supp. V 1993). An investor, however,
is likely to want to know exactly what is required, considering the large
amount of capital required for the investment andthe understandable desire
for certainty in his or her immigration status.
" See Sam Fulwood III, Would-Be Advisers Bank on Visas for Foreign
Millionaires, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at A5.
54 1d
65 See supra section 2.1.
See Joel Connelly, Vancouver Model for Pacific Boom, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 25, 1993, at 3I. Foreign investment in British Columbia,
particularly in Vancouver, has helped the province ride out the recession
that severely impacted the rest of Canada. Asian investment also has
created a huge real estate boom in the province. Ironically, in the recent
Canadian elections, the Conservative Premier of British Columbia was
replaced by a candidate of the Reform Party, who supports a curb on
immigration. Id.
" See Susan Freinkel, Buying Into America: 'Investor Visa' Program
Spawns Legal Niche, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 2. The former
governor of Ohio, Richard Celeste, set up an international consulting firm
1994]
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states also prepared to welcome foreign investors.5 s  In
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, U.S. states, businesses, and
attorneys attempted to lure potential foreign investors with
newspaper advertisements, seminars, and trade shows.5"
In contrast to these high expectations, the results of the
Program so far have been disappointing. Only 177 foreigners
applied for immigrant investor visas during the Program's first
year 0 and only 500 applied in its second year.6 ' As of July
31, 1993, a total of only 1,036 applications had been filed."
In contrast, nearly nineteen million applications for a lottery
program that offered 40,000 visas to citizens of thirty-four
countries were submitted during that program's first year. 3
The Program's failure is glaring, particularly when compared
to the relative success of the Canadian immigrant investor
program."
that attempted to identify rich overseas investors who would be interested
in the program. The governor and his partner, Pari Sabety, made trips to
Hong Kong and Taiwan and spent approximately $120,000 on their efforts.
They did not end up with a single client. See Ted Wendling, Visa Venture
No Ticket to Success: Information Expert Calls Celeste's Claims to Investors
Untrue, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 26, 1993, at 16A.
" See Leung, supra note 17, at Al. The lieutenant governor of
California, Leo McCarthy, headed an effort by California to attract investors
to the state. California was mired in a deep recession at the time and
already had attracted a large number of Asian immigrants. The effort
primarily targeted Hong Kong. Id.
s See Su, supra note 21, at 64.
60 See Dunn, supra note 26, at A3; Seth Mydans, Foreign Millionaires in
No Rush to Apply for Visas, U.S. Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, § 1, at
18. But see Tony Bizjak, Rich Aren't Knocking at U.S. Door; Officials
Concede $1 Million 'Investor Visa' Program Is a Bust, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 2, 1993, at Al (noting that 59 people applied for the Program in its first
year). The difference between these two figures is not explained by other
sources.
61 See Bizjak, supra note 60, at Al.
62 See INS Implements New Pilot Program for Immigrant Investors, 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1129, 1129 (Aug. 30, 1993).
6" See Mydans, supra note 60, at 18. The lottery program was enacted
to achieve greater diversity in immigration, as the 1965 changes to the U.S.
immigration laws dramatically reduced the number of visas available to
immigrants from certain countries, particularly in Europe. See Grin &
Lawson, supra note 12, at 269-73.
64 See Fickle Investors Return to Canada, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec.
15, 1993, at 6a (Supp.).
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3.2. Criticisms of the Program
The Program's failure 5 surprised many observers in the
field of immigration law. Other commentators, however,
recognized from the outset that the Program was flawed. For
instance, many believed that Congress wildly overestimated
the desire of foreign investors to come to the United States.
Evidently, many legislators thought that foreign investors
would seize the opportunity to obtain a U.S. passport,
particularly since a U.S. passport is considered the "Rolls-
Royce" of passports. 6 But, as one newspaper article put it,
"[flor wealthy investors, the symbolism of the American flag
apparently carries less weight than the dynamics of the
marketplace.""
A comparison of the Program with similar programs in
other countries illuminates the reasons the U.S. program has
not been particularly successful. For example, Canada
requires that its immigrant investors have a net worth of
$500,000 and make an investment of only $250,000,68 or even
$150,000 in certain cases." Rather than requiring the
investor to hire ten employees, as does the U.S. program, the
Canadian program requires investors to hire only one
employee. ° Australia's program requires an investment of
only $260,000 for an immigrant under forty years of age."'
For those who want only to purchase a visa and do not desire
a return on their investment, a visa from the island nation of
Tonga is available for only $17,500.72
65 See supra section 3.1.
66 Dunn, supra note 26, at A3.
67 See Mydans, supra note 60, at 18.
66 See Evans & Novak, supra note 15, at A27.
66 See Lawrence C. Lee, Note, The "Immigrant Entrepreneur" Provision
of the Immigration Act of 1990: Is a Single Entrepreneur Category
Sufficient?, 12 J.L. & COM. 147, 159-160 (1992).
7 0 Id. at 159.
71 See Endelman & Hardy, supra note 19, at 682. (noting that if an
investor is over the age of 58, he must make an investment of $640,000).
The investor must also have a track record of business success. Id. The
requirement of different amounts of capital for different age groups may
indicate that Australia is attempting to attract young, aggressive
entrepreneurs who will continue to do business in Australia and thus
generate more jobs and economic growth.
7-2 See Dunn, supra note 26, at A3.
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The Program is flawed in another important respect. Many
critics of the Program, such as Senator Bumpers, argued that
the Program would do no more than permit wealthy foreigners
to buy their way into the United States.7 This criticism is
not literally true, since the money that the immigrant is
required to invest goes into a new company, not to the federal
government. 4 , There is a vast difference between paying
money without any expectation of a return and investing
money in a business with the expectation of earning a return
on your investment. What Senator Bumpers' criticism actually
reveals is that immigrant investors are interested both in
earning a return on their money and in obtaining a visa. For
those aliens who want to enter the United States simply to
invest money, there already is a way into the country-the E-1
and E-2 treaty investment visas allow an immigrant to stay in
the United States indefinitely, provided that the immigrant is
managing a business in which he or she has invested
money.75
It is extremely difficult, however, to convert E-1 or E-2
status into permanent residency status. For immigrants who
want both to invest and to attain permanent residency in the
United States, the Program is intended to be their primary
avenue."' An additional problem with the Program, however,
is that it does not provide a mechanism for most E-1 and E-2
treaty investors to become permanent residents. There are
many immigrants who already have entered the United States
under the E-1 and E-2 treaty investor programs and have
created new businesses. Any E-1 or E-2 investor whose
original investment was made before passage of the Act cannot
participate in the Program and therefore cannot become a
permanent resident under its auspices, even by investing more
money in an already-existing business.
The employment mandate of the Program may not produce
the types of jobs that Congress envisioned when it created the
Program. Because the Program requires the investor to create
73 See 136 CONG. REC. S7768 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers).
71 If a foreigner only wants to buy a visa, the island of Tonga is
recommended. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 21.
71 See Bulk Farms, Inc. v. Martin, 963 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
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a large number of jobs for only $1 million, most of the jobs
created are likely to be low paying, minimum wage jobs in the
service sector, not the sort of high-wage, high-technology jobs
that can provide a good living for U.S. citizens.7 The types
of business opportunities that have been devised for immigrant
investors, such as car washes and hot dog stands, 8 though
they actually may create jobs in the short term, likely will
have only a nominal impact on the U.S. economy in the long
term.
Another reason for the failure of the Program is not related
to the Program itself, but to the U.S. tax code. Once an
immigrant becomes a permanent resident, he or she becomes
a U.S. national for tax purposes. This means that all of the
immigrant's income worldwide is subject to U.S. taxation-not
just income from U.S. sources. Other countries, such as
Canada, only tax income that the immigrant receives within
that country. This tax policy is another reason why potential
investors might choose to invest in a country other than the
United States. According to one commentator, this tax issue
is the biggest problem with the Program. 9
The regulations governing the Program also have been the
subject of criticism. A one-year delay in issuing these
regulations may have dissipated any momentum generated by
the passage of the Act. Although the final regulations were
revised to avoid some problems that were identified in the
interim rules,8" complaints persist. Many commentators
argue that the complexity of the regulations, especially the
"' This is important because in devising the Program, Congress was
motivated primarily by economic concerns, such as creating jobs and
increasing investment in the United States. See, e.g., Endelman & Hardy,
supra note 19, at 671.
78 See Dunn, supra note 26, at A12.
7 For a comprehensive analysis of this problem, see Ronald R. Rose,
Fixing the Wheel: A Critical Analysis of the Immigrant Investor Visa, 29
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 615, 617. Even with an E-2 treaty investor visa, an
immigrant may be subject to taxation if he or she resides for a certain
period of time within the United States.
" The proposed regulations were issued at 56 Fed. Reg. 30,703 (1991).
Under the interim rules, there was no provision for investors to combine
resources with other investors or to buy and maintain a business, rather
than start a new enterprise. INS added these provisions to the final
regulations. See Endelman & Hardy, supra note 19, at 673-74; Dunn, supra
note 26, at A12.
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detailed requirements regarding how capital must be invested
under the Program, have discouraged would-be investors."'
Furthermore, the INS has been very slow in processing the few
applications that it has received."
Finally, the INS's detailed disclosure requirements also
have discouraged investors. The disclosure requirements are
very burdensome, as the immigrant must reveal the source of
all of the capital that is to be invested.8 3  Also, the
information on the investor's application may be disclosed to
his or her home country-because of the U.S.'s liberal
information sharing policies-thus exposing the investor to
new tax liabilities in his or her home country.
8 4
3.3. The "Regional Center" Pilot Program
Congress itself is aware of the disappointing results of the
Program. In 1992, as part of the Fiscal Year 1993
Appropriations Act for the Department of Justice, Congress
enacted a pilot program designed to make it easier for certainimmigrants to obtain visas under the Program. The pilot
program directs the INS to designate approved "regional
centers," which are to promote economic growth, increasing
both productivity and exports. If an immigrant investor
participates in the pilot program, the job-creation
requirements of the Program are relaxed; for instance, the
immigrant may show that the required ten jobs were created
indirectly through increased exports.8 "
The statute creating the pilot program did not define
"regional center." The INS defines a "regional center" as "any
economic unit, public or private, which is involved with the
promotion of economic growth, including increased export
sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, and
81 See Dunn, supra note 26, at A12.
82 See Applegate, supra note 51, at F9. One application, submitted on
Sept. 30, 1991, was not approved by the INS until Feb. 1, 1992. The INS
has defended its processing delays by pointing out that it did not initiate the
Program and was caught off-guard when Congress enacted the Program. Id.
"" See Rose, supra note 79, at 634-36.
84 Id
8 See INS Implements New Pilot Program for Immigrant Investors,
supra note 62, at 1130.
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increased domestic capital." 6 INS officials have indicated
that a "regional center" may be nearly any entity that is
organized to benefit a particular geographic region, "ranging
from a state government agency to a consortium of
exporters.""'
In order to qualify as a "regional center," an entity must
meet four criteria. First, the entity must describe how the
center focuses on a geographic region of the United States and
how it will promote economic growth through improved
productivity, job creation, and increased domestic capital
investment.8" Second, the entity must detail how jobs will be
created indirectly through increased exports.89 Third, the
entity must disclose the amount and source of all capital that
has been committed to the center, as well as any promotional
activities it is engaged in.90 Fourth, the entity must show
that it will have a positive impact on "the regional or national
economy in general as reflected by such factors as increased
household earnings, greater demand for business services,
utilities, maintenance and repair, and construction both within
and without the regional center."9 ' Finally, the proposal
must be supported by "economically or statistically valid
forecasting tools."92 The INS has indicated that it will allow
several regional centers to qualify for participation in the pilot
program, although it is not clear from the statute whether
Congress intended for multiple regional centers to be created,
or only one. 3
An immigrant participating in the pilot program also must
file a petition showing how his or her investment in the
regional center will create the required ten jobs, which may
include jobs created indirectly through increased exports. The
petition can show job creation by "reasonable methodologies,"
which include "multiplier tables, feasibility studies, analysis
of foreign and domestic markets for the goods or services to be
so Id.
87 Id.
as See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(m) (1993).
8sId.
"oId.
90 Id.
s2 Id.
"sId.
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exported, and other economically or statistically valid
forecasting devices."94 The immigrant's petition additionally
must comply with all of the other requirements of the original
Program.95 If a petition is successful, the INS will grant the
investor permanent residency on a conditional basis but if the
regional center's approval is withdrawn, the investor's
permanent residency also will be terminated, unless the
investor can establish continued eligibility under the original
Program. 6
This pilot program is unlikely to increase interest in the
Program for two reasons. First, the application for
participation in the pilot program is just as complicated as the
one required for participation in the original Program. The
requirement that ten jobs be created indirectly through exports
by using "reasonable methodologies" is complex and subjective
and investors are unlikely to feel that obtaining a U.S. visa is
worth the effort of trying to meet this requirement. The ten-
job requirement in the original Program, although onerous,
had the virtue of being a "bright line" test: if ten jobs were
created (and other conditions were met), then the application
for a visa was approved. 7 Second, apart from a slight
relaxation of the job-creation requirement, all of the other
problems with the Program still exist.9 Also, even if the
pilot program is popular with investors, there are only 300
visas available under it and demand quickly may outstrip
supply. In addition, the effect of the pilot program on the U.S.
economy will be minimal, since at most 3,000 jobs will be
created under its auspices.
There are, however, some aspects of the pilot program that
are encouraging. By approving entities as regional centers,
the INS guarantees that an investment in the regional center
will be approved, so long as the investor meets the other
criteria under the original Program. The regional centers, as
part of their effort to attract investment, could streamline the
application process by providing a ready-made investment
94 Id.
95 Id.
99 Id
e See Rose, supra note 79, at 627.
8 For an analysis of the defects of the original Program, see supra
section 3.2.
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opportunity. Close regulation of the regional centers also
could protect investors from fraudulent promoters, which has
become a significant problem with Canada's investment
program.9"
The regional center pilot program is a worthy attempt to
increase the number of investors participating in the Program.
The scope of the pilot program is too small, however, to
increase significantly the number of immigrants who will
apply for visas under the Program. More radical solutions are
necessary.
4. REFORM OF THE PROGRAM
4.1. What is the Objective of the Program?
One of the main problems with the Program is that it has
no clear objective. Is the Program's goal to create jobs, to
attract foreign investment, or to encourage foreign investors to
emigrate to the United States? One commentator has called
the Program "schizophrenic,""° and another has noted that
"Congress has failed to recognize that the twin policy goals of
increasing new employment and infusing new capital [into the
United States] are separate and not necessarily
overlapping."" 1
An analysis of the legislative history of the Program
illustrates this confusion over the proper goals of the Program.
In the debate over the Bumpers Amendment, which would
have eliminated the Program from the Act, senators cited
different purposes for the Program, including job creation," 2
encouraging entrepreneurs to emigrate,'0 3 and increasing
capital investment.'" The Senate committee report states
" See infra section 4.2.
100 Wildes, supra note 46, at *1.
101 Lee, supra note 69, at 148-49.
102 135 CONG. REC. S7771 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) ("[If you are able to get individuals with certain types of skills,
that is going to mean more employment for Americans ....").
103 135 CONG. REc. S7771 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Gramm) ("We need to bring people to this country who have
[entrepreneurial] skills and talents, and can help us create jobs, growth, and
opportunity.").
1*4 135 CONG. REC. S7773 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Simpson) ("What we are doing here is intending to ... infuse new capital
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that the Program "is intended to create new employment for
U.S. workers and to infuse new capital into the country.""'5
The Program as currently implemented will satisfy none of
these goals. If the Program's primary objective is to create
jobs, then the $1 million investment floor actually may impede
that objective, either by discouraging creation of- businesses
that could generate the required number of jobs for a lower
initial investment,' or by encouraging creation of
businesses that generate low-technology, minimum-wage jobs,
which likely are not the kinds of jobs that Congress sought to
create under the Program." If the Program's primary goal
is to attract foreign entrepreneurs, then the $1 million
investment floor will keep individuals out of the Program who
do not have $1 million to invest, but who may, nevertheless, be
astute businesspersons.'0 o Further, the Program does not
require immigrants to show that they actually possess any
business experience or to demonstrate any past success as an
entrepreneur. Finally, if the Program's goal is to attract
foreign capital to the United States, the United States actually
may lose money as immigrants who do not have as much as $1
million to invest take their capital and invest in other
countries at a much lower entry cost. 09
The primary goals of the Program should be to attract
capital and to attract those who know how to use it-in other
words, entrepreneurs. Additional jobs would be the inevitable
by-product of subsequent economic expansion. Senator Paul
Simon of Illinois has stated that "we do not want or need
excessive or arbitrary industrial policy tests about what
constitutes a worthwhile investment."' 0 An arbitrary job
creation requirement (such as the Program's ten job
requirement) is a form of industrial policy, because it narrows
into our economy .... ").
105 S. REP. No. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).
10 See Lee, supra note 69, at 162. Lee refers to a franchise developer
who states that certain fast-food franchises could be developed for less than
$150,000 and employ at least 10 people.
107 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
108 See Lee, supra note 69, at 162.
.0. See supra section 3.2.
110 136 CONG. REC. S17112 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Simon).
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the type of investments that an immigrant may make. Also,
a worthwhile investment might not generate jobs directly but
may create them indirectly, as the regional center pilot
program recognizes. One commentator has advocated that two
separate investment categories be created within the Program
to take into account the dual objectives of increasing foreign
investment in and attracting immigrant entrepreneurs to the
United States."' This argument underlies the reforms
suggested in section 4.3.
4.2. The Canadian Example
Canada's immigrant investor program has been very
successful in attracting foreign investment, although estimates
of the number of jobs created and the amount of capital
invested recently have been revised downward." 2
Notwithstanding its apparent success, there have been serious
problems with this program, which have prompted the
province of Manitoba to withdraw from the program"3 and
have led one Canadian newspaper to state, "[b]y all accounts,
Canada's immigrant-investor program is a shambles.""4 By
examining these problems, the United States can avoid making
the same mistakes.
Under the Canadian program, immigrants can invest their
capital in one of two ways: 1) either create their own
businesses; or 2) invest in an immigrant investor fund that
invests in the Canadian economy." 5 Problems have resulted
from both methods. Many businesses created by immigrant
investors actually exist only on paper, with no actual economic
1 See Lee, supra note 69, at 163-65.
12 See Philip Lee, Many Asians Abuse Canada's Migrant Investor
Scheme, THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993, World Section, at 9 (hereinafter
Lee, Asians Abuse Investor Scheme). According to a Canadian audit carried
out in 1992, only 5,500 jobs were created from 1986 to 1989 instead of the
estimated 8,000, and only $333 million was invested instead of the $833
pledged. I.
11 See John Gold, Immigration Door Closes in Canada, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 30, 1993, at 2.
n4 If It's Broke, Fix It, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 27, 1993, at A4.
' See Cecil Foster, Cash-for-Visa Program Takes Heat: Critics Cite
Inadequate Regulation, THE FINANCIAL POST (Toronto), Feb. 9, 1993, § 1, at
50.
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activity taking place." 6  Furthermore, the immigrant
investor funds are created and policed by the provinces,"'
not the national government, and there have been allegations
of corruption and mismanagement of these funds."' These
allegations have led Canada to issue new regulations requiring
prospectuses for foreign investors and annual audits of the
funds. Fund managers who disobey these new regulations are
subject to criminal penalties." 9
There also is evidence that criminals have abused the
Canadian program. Some observers suspect that the program
has been used to launder foreign money.2 ' Members of
Asian organized crime gangs, particularly the infamous triads
that control extortion, prostitution, gambling, drug trafficking,
and other illegal activities in Hong Kong, have used the
immigrant investor program to gain entry into Canada. They
are particularly eager to leave Hong Kong before China takes
over in 1997.121 Canadian law makes it difficult for
Canadian immigration officials to reject the applications even
of known triad figures, requiring extensive paperwork to deny
admission to an applicant.
122
... See Lee, Asians Abuse Investor Scheme, supra note 112, at 9.
117 Canada is a federal nation, composed of 11 provinces and two
territories. The provinces are the equivalent of U.S. states.
11 See Foster, supra note 115, at 50. One fund solicited capital from
Asian immigrants, promising to invest the money in strip malls. Instead,
the $34 million in investments were put in an unsuccessful gold mine in
northern Saskatchewan. Id. Eventually, the investors filed suit against the
manager of the fund. See Dann Rogers, 'Citizenship for Sale' Programme
Criticism Grows, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 30, 1993, Business Section,
at 4; Swardson, supra note 18, at A12.
119 See Rogers, supra note 116, at 4.
120 Id.
121 See Ben Tierney, Dragons At Our Door: Triad Leaders Want to Reside
in Canada Before China Takes Over Hong Kong, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 26,
1992, at B1.
" Id. Under U.S. law, an immigration official has the authority to
exclude any alien who the official has reason to believe seeks to enter to
engage in criminal activity, or to exclude any suspected drug trafficker. See
Rose, supra note 79, at 637.
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4.3. Suggested Reforms
To meet the recommended goals of attracting both foreign
investment and immigrant entrepreneurs to the United States,
Congress should reform the Program. First, the amount of
capital required to participate in the Program should be
lowered to $500,000 and to $250,000 for a targeted
employment area."'3 This change would make the Program
more competitive with the Canadian and Australian
immigrant investor programs,"= which vie with the U.S.
program in attracting foreign investors. The INS should be
given the authority to lower this threshold amount further if
the Program continues to be unsuccessful.'2 5
Second, the U.S. program should emulate the Canadian
program by permitting an immigrant to invest his or her
capital in either of two ways: 1) by creating a new business;
or 2) by investing in a government-approved fund that, in turn,
would invest the money in job-creating businesses. These two
options would fulfill different goals: the former would operate
to attract true entrepreneurs and the latter would operate
primarily to increase the level of foreign investment in the
United States. Certain safeguards, however, should be
maintained in order to prevent the type of problems that have
plagued the Canadian immigrant investor program.
For immigrants desiring to establish a new business, the
current job-creation requirement of the Program should be
lowered substantially. This, coupled with a lower initial
investment threshold, would attract true entrepreneurs and
the types of businesses they could create no longer would be
circumscribed by arbitrarily-established requirements. The
Program should require, however, that investors show some
past business success, or some experience in managing a
business, as does Australia's immigrant investor program. 6
Additionally, the Program should continue to make an
investor's residency under the Program conditional for two
123 For the definition of a "targeted employment area," see 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.6(e) (1993).
124 See Mydans, supra note 60, at 18.
1 Of course, some floor should be set by Congress-perhaps $200,000,
half of that in a targeted employment area.
126 See Endelman & Hardy, supra note 19, at 682.
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years in order to ensure not only the creation but the
continuing operation of a bona fide business, thus avoiding the
problem of "paper businesses" such as those that have
proliferated under the Canadian program.
If an immigrant chooses to invest in a fund, rather than to
create a new business, the immigrant should not be required
to prove that the fund creates jobs directly. Only investments
in funds that are authorized by the U.S. government would
qualify under the Program. To receive authorization, the
managers of the fund themselves would have to show that the
fund is investing primarily in financial activity that creates
jobs. This is similar to the job-creation requirements of the
regional center pilot program.' In order for an immigrant
to be able to invest a lower amount of capital ($250,000), the
fund would be required to show that it invests primarily in
targeted employment areas. Annual audits of the funds should
be conducted to prevent fraud and mismanagement. 2 ' Once
the immigrant has proved that he or she has invested the
required amount of capital in an approved fund and that the
capital came from legitimate sources, 2 ' he or she should
immediately be granted full permanent residency, with no
requirement that this residency be conditional for two
years.3 0 Furthermore, by approving funds ahead of time,
the INS will reduce the amount of paperwork and
documentation required of immigrant investors participating
in the Program.
These changes may not address all of the problems with
the Program, but other changes that have been suggested by
commentators either are unrealistic or would subject the
Program to abuses. For example, changing the federal tax
code so that an immigrants' income from U.S. sources only
would be taxed in the United States, as one commentator has
suggested,' 3 ' is politically unrealistic.' Abolishing the
127 See supra section 3.3.
128 See Rogers, supra note 118, at 4.
129 Although this disclosure requirement may discourage some potential
investors, on balance it is necessary to prevent criminals from entering the
United States, a problem that has plagued the Canadian program. See
supra section 3.2 and infra note 134.
10 Criminals could still be excluded and the residency could be revoked
if the immigrant's application is discovered to be fraudulent.
13, See Rose, supra note 79, at 617-29.
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disclosure requirements, as the same commentator also has
suggested,' would increase the likelihood of criminals
entering the country through the Program.TM
5. CONCLUSION
To date, the Immigrant Investor Program has not been
successful. As it has been shown that foreign investment
actually benefits the U.S. economy, efforts to attract foreign
investment through the Program should be renewed by
reforming the Program. First, the Program's goals should be
articulated clearly to reflect dual objectives: attracting both
foreign investment and immigrant entrepreneurs. Second, the
structure of the Program should be reformed, most importantly
by providing the immigrant with two prospective investment
options: creating a business that will generate economic
activity or investing in an INS-approved investment fund that
will generate jobs.
Canada's experience with its immigrant investor program
indicates that such programs can be successful. The United
States should learn from the Canadian example, however, and
ensure that its reforms are not implemented haphazardly and
in such a way that they subject the Program to potential fraud
and abuse. At a time when sixty-one percent of the public
thinks that the United States' open immigration policy should
be reexamined,' the Program still has the potential to
demonstrate that immigrants can be a vital and productive
force within the U.S. economy.
" During the 1992 Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton attacked then-
President George Bush for supposedly giving tax breaks to foreign
companies operating within the United States. This generally was agreed
to be a "powerful image." A tax break for immigrants is likely to be just as
unpopular, particularly in the current anti-immigrant climate. See Richard
L. Berke, The 1992 Campaign: The Ad Campaign; Clinton: Attacking
Policy on Foreign Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1992, at A21.
133 See Rose, supra note 79, at 634-41.
134 Triad leaders in Hong Kong often have large amounts of money, most
of it obtained from illegal sources. Canada's experience with its immigrant
investor program reveals that foreign criminals will use such a program to
try to legitimize their entry into the country. Requiring immigrant
investors to disclose the source of their capital may discourage criminals
from entering the United States. See Tierney, supra note 121, at B1.
13 See Fierman, supra note 2, at 76.
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